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वर्ष-१०	अंधरा ठाढ़ी	दरभङ्गा	अङ्क-१
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मित्र - वाणी

वाचस्पति-श्रद्धा

वाचस्पति समिति, ग्रा०—पो०—अन्धरा ठाढ़ी (दरभंगा)

१८८५ शकाब्द

माद्र कृष्ण कृष्ण-मन्वाष्टमी

प्रधान सम्पादक

पं० श्री खड्गर भा

न्याय वेदान्त व्याकरणाचार्य

सहायक सम्पादक

पं० श्री विश्वम्भर भा

वे० सा० व्या० आ०

पं० श्री दापोदर भा

सा० प्रा०

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प्रकाशक

पं० श्री सहदेव भा

मन्त्री

वाचस्पति समिति

पा० पो०—अम्बरा-ठाढ़ी

जिला—दरभंगा

बिहार

प्राप्ति स्थान

मन्त्री

वाचस्पति समिति

ब्रह्मस्थान

अम्बरा-ठाढ़ी

जिला—दरभंगा, बिहार

भारत

व्या

कमला पुस्तक सदन

अम्बरा-ठाढ़ी

जिला—दरभंगा

बिहार

वाचस्पति-विशेषाङ्क के लेखों तथा लेखकों की सूची

संख्या	लेखों के शीर्षक	लेखकों के नाम	पृष्ठाङ्क
		(हिन्दी)	
१	आत्मचरित्र	महात्मा श्री गन्दीश्वर भट्ट (संस्कृत)	(क)
२	वाचस्पतिहस्ता स्वीकृत्यायवातिक- तात्पर्यटीका प्रकाशितः	प्राचीन-हस्त-लेखकः	(ट)
३	वाचस्पति मत-समीक्षा	विश्वविख्यात भगिनव-बङ्कुराचार्य स्वामी श्री हरिहरानन्द सरस्वती "करपात्री" श्री महाराज	१
४	श्रीवाचस्पतेः सम्प्रदायानुगतिः ।	म० म० श्री गिरिधर शर्मा कपूरेंद्रः	४३
५	वाचस्पतिमिश्राः भारतीय-राजनीतिम्	पण्डितराज श्री राजेश्वर शास्त्री, बाराणसी	५७
६	श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्रमते स्वप्रकाशयन्त्य-स्वस्या- त्मनो वृत्तिविशेषसम्बद्धस्य ज्ञानस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यम्	दार्शनिक रत्न पं० श्री शशिनाथ भट्ट, मिथिला- संस्कृत विद्यापीठ, दरभंगा	६२
७	दार्शनिकेषु श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्रस्य प्राधान्यम् ।	न्यायादिमर्मज्ञ पं० श्री शशिनाथ भट्ट, मिथिला- संस्कृत-विद्यापीठ दरभंगा	६७
८	महामहोपाध्याय (ब्रह्म) वाचस्पतिमिश्रः	म० म० डा० श्री मधुमेष्ठ मिश्र दरभंगा- कामेश्वर सिंह संस्कृत विश्वविद्यालयपुनर्पतिः	७४
९	सर्वतन्त्र स्वतन्त्रः श्रीमहाचस्पतिमिश्रः, तस्य न्याय तात्पर्य-टीका च	न्यायाचार्य स्व० बामाचरण बट्टाचार्यः	१०२
१०	प्रतिबिम्बवादावच्छेदवादयोर्वाचस्पतेर्हृदयम्	स्व० पण्डित उषानन्द भट्ट, प्रधानाचार्य, रानीबन्दावती श्यामा महाविद्यालय, काशी	१०५
११	वाचस्पतिमिश्रेण चार्वाकमतसंग्रहणम्	पं० श्री स्वनाथ भट्ट दर्शनार्थ्यापक, गवर्नमेंट- संस्कृत-कालेज, मुजफ्फरपुर	१०८
१२	अनगता साहस्यतत्त्व कोमुदी	पं० श्री गुरलीचर भट्ट डा० व्या० बर्म० साहि- त्याचार्यः, धन्वराठाड़ीग्रामवास्तव्यः, गोनौली- स्व० संस्कृत विद्यालय-प्रधानाध्यापकः	१११
१३	वाचस्पतिमिश्रस्य ध्वज्येस्वादः	पं० श्री नारायण मिश्रः व्या० व्या० प्राचार्यः एम० ए० प्राप्तस्वर्णपदकः	११५
१४	वाचस्पतिमते जीवस्वरूप-विचारः	पं० श्री सृष्टिनारायण भट्ट वेदान्ताचार्यः, विशि- ष्टाचार्यभट्ट, मिथिला	११८

संख्या	लेखों के शीर्षक	लेखकों के नाम	पृष्ठांक
११	वाचस्पतिमिश्रस्य मैथिलसत्त्वम्	व्या० व्या० सा० वं० श्री रविनाथ ठाकुर: नेपाल - राजकीय - संस्कृत - महाविद्यालय, मटिहानी (जनकपुर)	१२१
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१७	प्रधान सम्भावकीयम्	वं० श्री सुन्दर झा व्या० व्या० आचार्य प्राध्यापक, हि० वि० वि० सं० म० वि० काशी	१२५

(अंग्रेजी)

१८	Studies on Vacaspati Misra (I)	Prof. Anantlal Thakur, Mithila Sanskrit Research Institute Darbhanga.	१२२
१९	Vacaspati Misra A Syncretist ?	Miss Madeleine Biardeau 45 rue des Favourite Paris 15 France.	१२७
२०	Vacaspati's Critique of the Bhedabheda Doctrine of Bhas- kara	Dr. J. A. B. Van Buitenen Reader in Indian philosophy University of Utrecht, Utrecht, Holland.	१४३

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२१	भारत वासियों से (कविता)	श्री विजयकान्त मिश्र 'प्रवासी' साहित्याभिरुचि	११२
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२३	आचार्य वाचस्पतिमिश्र और उनका अद्वैत- वेदान्त में स्थान	वं० श्री प्रवीरभ झा व्या० वेदान्ताचार्य, हरिपुर- डङ्गा (दरभंगा)	११९
२४	मीमांसा में वाचस्पति का परिचय	वं० श्री रामचन्द्र शास्त्री ज्ञानज्ञ पुरभीमांसाचार्य वेदान्तशास्त्री, प्राध्यापक, मीमांसा-विभाग, हि० वि० वि० बाराणसी	१६५
२५	एक जीववाद और नानाजीववाद	वं० श्री सुपनारायण झा प्राध्यापक, वारा- णसेय-संस्कृत वि० वि० बाराणसी	१६७
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संख्या	लेखों के शीर्षक	लेखकों के नाम	पृष्ठांक
२८	वाचस्पति मिश्र	कविराज श्री हरिवंश बोधी, काव्य-शास्त्र- स्मृति-टीर्थ	१७८
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३०	दार्शनिक-कलाकार श्री वाचस्पति मिश्र	वं० श्री गंगेश मिश्र, नव्यव्याख्याचार्य, हरिपुर, कन्नौजाही, दरभंगा	१८२
३१	वाचस्पति मिश्र की कुछ कविताएँ	वं० श्री सुपनारायण झा प्राध्यापक, वाराण- सेय संस्कृत वि० वि० बाराणसी	१९१
३२	योग-दर्शन में विज्ञान जित्वा और वाचस्पति मिश्र	वं० श्री जगिता-प्रसाद डबराल, टिमली मइयान	१९४
३३	वाचस्पति के सम्बन्ध में दो शब्द	स्व० वं० निजोकनाथ मिश्र जी	२०१
३४	महामहोपाध्याय सर्वतन्त्र - स्वतन्त्र वाचस्पति मिश्र	वं० श्री आचार्यराय झा, प्रधानाध्यापक, राजकीय संस्कृत उच्च विद्यालय, खपरा	२०२
३५	मिथिला में ज्ञानमार्ग, उसमें वाचस्पति मिश्र का स्थान	वं० श्री विश्वम्भर झा व्या० सा० वे० आचार्य म० रमेशचरण सा० महाविद्यालय, दरभंगा	२०४
३६	भारतीय-दर्शन और वाचस्पति मिश्र	वं० श्री कामीकान्त झा व्या० आचार्य काव्य-टीर्थ	२१३
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(अंग्रेजी)

३९	वाचस्पति (कविता)	कविशेखर वं० श्री बरही नाथ झा	२३६
४०	आचार्य वाचस्पतिक जल वे मन के इन्द्रियत्व- सिद्धिपूर्वक बहुप्रमाणात्मक प्रति कारणता	वं० श्री स्वामिमुन्दर झा, व्या० वे० आचार्य	२३६
४१	इन्द्र-वाचस्पतिक जन्मस्थान	वं० श्री बालदेव झा, एम० ए० इय, व्या० सा० आचार्य	२३८
४२	मित्र बाणी वाचस्पति-सङ्कट प्रेरणाक संस्मरण एवं जगदाक वाचना	वं० श्री सहदेव झा, व्या० सा० सा० शास्त्री संस्कृत-विभाग, म० रा० हा० मूल्य अम्बरा- ठाड़ी, दरभंगा	२४१

Studies on Vacaspati Misra (I)

Prof. Anantlal Thakur Mithila Sanskrit Research Institute Darbhanga.

इस लेख में विद्वान् लेखक ने यह स्पष्ट किया है कि 'सर्वतन्त्र-स्वतन्त्र' पद केवल वाचस्पति मिश्र में ही सार्थक है। इनकी कृतियों के विवाद परिचय के साथ इनके ग्रन्थों के विषय में जो विदेशीय तथा स्वदेशीय विद्वानों ने साक्षात् वा परम्परया लिखा है उसका संक्षिप्त विवरण भी दिया गया है।

Vacaspati Misra's is a hallowed name in the domain of Indian thought. He is known as *Sarvalantrasarvalantra*—an independent writer on all the systems of philosophy and the title is equally appropriate in no other case. The orthodox thought came to a crisis due to the onslaughts of intellectual giants like Dharmakirti and Santaraksita of the Buddhist school. It was Vacaspati who through his contributions saved the systems. Nay, he enriched them by opening up new vistas and read new meanings in the old treatises which were unknown to his predecessors. A gifted man, he could easily write original works of his own. But he remained satisfied in writing commentaries which immortalised the old systems.

Thus his (1) *Nyayakanika* is a commentary on Mandana Misra's *Vidhiviveka*. The next work (2) the *Tattvasamiksa* on vedanta has unfortu-

nately not come to light. (3) The *Tattvabindu* elucidates some of the Bhatta school. (4) The views of the *Nyayavartika tatparyatika*, as the name indicates, is a sub-commentary on the *Nyayavartika* of Uddyotakara. (5) The *Nyaya-sucinibandha* is a critical edition of the Gotamasutra really forming an appendix to No. 4, (6) The *Sankhhyatattva-kaumudi* is a commentary on the Karlakas of Isvarakrsna (7) The *Tattvavasaradi* is a sub-commentary on the *Vyasabhasya* on the Yogasutras of Patanjali. (8) The *Bhamati* elucidates the Sankarabhasya on the *Brahmasutras*. The above shows that all his labours were to strengthen the ancient edifices.

Posterity showed proper respects to him by writing glosses on his works. The *Bhamati* was the source of different sub-school of vedanta. The *Nyayavartikatatparyatika* was commented

upon by no less a great figure than Udayanacarya. The *Vivaranapancika* of Aniruddha, the *Pancaprasthananayatilppanaka* of Srikantha and the *Nyayalamkara* of Abhayatilakasuri give Vacaspati the proper place in their respective works. It is interesting to note that both Srikantha and Abhayatilaka belonged to the Jaina community which shows that the Nyaya views of Vacaspati were respected by the non-orthodox people also.

The relation of Vacaspati with the Buddhists was of scholarly antagonism. He refuted the views of the Buddhists, and specially of Dharmakirti, in all his major works. The Buddhists took great pains to re-establish their position after criticising the *Nyayavartikatatparyatika* and the *Nyayakanika*. They considered these two as the best works of Vacaspati and did not touch even the *Bhamati*, the contribution of his mature age. It may be noted that Jnanasrimitra of Vikramasita regarded Vacaspati as one of the strongest pillars of the altar of orthodox philosophy.

To the logicians of Bengal and Mithila Vacaspati is known either as the 'Tatparyacarya' or as the 'Tikakara'. The former title is according

to his Nyaya work, the *Tatparyatika*. And it is well known that he was predominantly a Naiyayika. The latter title is due to the fact that he was the only successful writer of commentaries which embraced all the branches of orthodox philosophy. The *Tatparyatika*, as we have seen elsewhere, occupied the prominent position among the Nyaya works and eclipsed many important treatises of the system. We learn of the works of logicians like Aviddhakarna, Samkara, Priticandra, Adhyayana, Trilocana, Visvarupa, Satananda, Sanatani and others. But all of them went into oblivion due to the overwhelming influence of the *Tatparyatika*. The all-embracing character of this work seems to have made them redundant. Aniruddha has pointed out that Vacaspati follows the track beaten by his illustrious guru, Trilocana. Vacaspati himself also accepts his indebtedness to Trilocana. But the fact remains unaltered that among the numerous works of his predecessors in the Nyaya School those have only survived which have a touch of approval in the *Tatparyatika*. There are two Sub-commentaries on the *Nyayakanika*—the *Svadicankaranam* and *Jusaddhankaranam* and one on the *Tattvabindu*—the *Tattvavibhavana*.

Unfortunately for us the works of Vacaspati were comparatively neglected during some centuries when the minds of the Naiyayikas were occupied with the Neo-logic of Mithila and Bengal. But we must remember with gratitude the scholars of the last century who brought all these works to light with of course one exception the **Tattvasamiksa** remaining untraced. The late Pandit Dharmadatta (Vacca) Jha of hallowed memory began his **Tatparyatattvaloka** but was snatched away from amongst us before he could complete it. His veteran students Nyayapradhanacharya, Vidyavacaspati, Pt. Sasinatha Jha and Pt. Lakshminatha Jha are still carrying on the 'Sampradaya' of Vacaspati in Mithila. Pt. Sasinath as a Visistavidvan in the Mithila Institute is supervising its research publications in Indian Philosophy himself contributing a few important volumes. The latter is the head of the Department of Oriental Philosophy in the Hindu University, Banaras. His commentaries—the **Prakasa** and the **Vikasa** on the first four sections of the **Bhamati** have been published from Banaras.

The Anglo-Sanskrit Scholars made important contributions towards the revival of the studies of Vacaspati's

works. Here the contribution of eminent scholars like MM Dr. Ganganath Jha, MM. Dr. Gopinath Kaviraja and some of the illustrious professors of the University of Calcutta deserve special mention. Dr. Satish Chandra Vidyabhusana in his pioneer work, the History of Indian Logic, dealt with Vacaspati's contribution in Indian logic along with other problems connected with them. Dr. S.N. Das Gupta and Dr. Radhakrishnan also allotted proper places to him in their works. Vacaspati's position vis-a-vis his Buddhist predecessors has been thoroughly dealt with by Dr. Satkari Mookerjee. Many intricate problems regarding this author have been solved by the late Professor Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya.

With the establishment of the Mithila Institute the studies on Vacaspati Misra have gained a new impetus.

The institute is now a meeting ground of many scholars who are working on the problems connected with Vacaspati. As Vacaspati is an all India figure and his works are studied throughout the length and breadth of India, it is not possible to accommodate every scholar working on him in any single institution. But the

workers in the Institute are keeping close contact with all those who are interested in Vacaspati studies. The Institute proposes to take up the publication of the critical Edition of the **Nyayavartikatatparyatika** along with the **Nyayabhasya**, the **Nyayavartika** and the **Parisuddhi** with the **Alamkara** of Abhayatilaka under the comprehensive title of the **Nyayacaturganthika** so well-known to ancient masters like Vacaspati II and Sankara Misra. The publication of the works of the Late Dharmadatta Jha is also in view in which, it is hoped, his **Tatparyatattvaloka** will also be included.

The works of Vacaspati have been grouped into three divisions—The Vedanta, The Nyaya and the rest, for critical study. The Vedanta views have been critically dealt with by Dr. Hasurkar, one of the pupils of Dr. P. L. Vaidya, former Director, and his studies have been published in the Institute series. The third item has been taken up by Professor Sobhakant Jaidev Jha.

The Nyaya views of Vacaspati have attracted several others including Pt. Sasinath Jha and Dr. Satansusekhar Bagchi. A contribution of the former will be found in these pages. The latter has given a critical analysis of

Vacaspati's views on Induction in his **Inductive Reasoning**. Young scholars in the institute are also taking interest in Vacaspati. An interesting paper has been contributed by Sri Vasudeva Jha M.A. on Vacaspati's Guru Trilocana. Prof. Mahaprabhulal Goswami is carrying on his studies on the **Bhamati** and the other sub-schools of Advaita Vedanta.

The undersigned has been working on a new problem—The successors of Vacaspati Misra in the Buddhist school and their works. There was so long a dark chapter in the History of Nyaya philosophy which is otherwise complete and runs parallel with the Buddhistic school of logic. Attacks and counter attacks between Naiyayikas as well as the Buddhists brought about a healthy growth in both the schools till the Buddhists were uprooted from Indian soil by the Mohamedan invasion. But so long there was a gap between Vacaspati and Udayanacharya. The Buddhist author criticising Vacaspati and himself being the target of attack of Udayana was missing. Fortunately for us this gap has now been filled up by the discovery of the works of Jnanasrimitra in Tibet by Mahapandita Rahulasankrityayana along with the works of Ratnakirti, Jnanasri's disciple, who also came between the

above-mentioned Nyaya—scholars. Their works all together twenty-two in number have been published under the auspices of the K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna.

It may be added here that the former Director of the Institute, MM Dr. Umesha Misra gave some new light on the philosophical views of this author. We hope that the forthcoming volumes of his History of Indian philosophy will give more informations about Vacaspati's personality and scholarship

We give below the names of some articles having some bearing on Vacaspati contributed by the scholars of the Institute.

1. Vacaspati Misra's Reference to King Adisura—Vangiya Sahitya Parishat Patrika Vol-57

2. The Naiyayika Trilocana—as a Teacher of Vacaspati—Indian Culture, Vol—XIV.

3. Jnanasrimitra and his Ksanabhangadhyaya. —Journal Bihar Research Society, Vol. XXXVI.

4. Tatparyacarya — Journal, Asiatic Society, Bengal, Vol. XVII

5. Ratnakirti and his works— Journal, Bihar Research Society, Vol. XXXVII.

6. Nyayamanjari of Guru Triloca— Journal, Bihar Research Society XLI.

7. Jnanasrimitra and his works— Journal, Bihar Research Society, Buddha Jayanti Special Issue.



Vacaspati Misra A Syncretist?

Miss Madeleine Biardeau 45 rue des Favourite Paris 15 France.

प्रकृत लेख में विदुषी लेखिका ने गवेषणापूर्ण उद्देश्यों तथा उनकी व्याख्याओं के द्वारा वाचस्पति मिश्र के इस दृष्टिकोण को स्पष्ट किया है कि सभी धार्मिक दर्शन स्वयं पूर्ण नहीं, प्रत्युत पूर्ण वैदिक धर्म का एक एक अंश है। ये परस्पर विरुद्ध नहीं हैं, क्योंकि पूर्ण का पूर्ण के साथ वास्तविक विरोध होता है, अंश का अंश के साथ नहीं। अतः मिश्र जी का सभी धार्मिक दर्शनों में सामंजस्य तथा वैशिष्ट्य लाने का प्रयत्नपूर्ण प्रयास सत्य है।

It has been wondered more than once at least among western scholars—how Vacaspati Misra could have commented upon all the darsanas so faithfully, and could have advocated one after the other all the most divergent theories occurring in Brahmanical philosophy. This however is no real problem for the Indian thinkers of today who have by now got fully accustomed to the view that the darsanas instead of being contradictory to one another, are rather supplementing one another. But this view is the result of the late centuries' developments of Indian thought and could not possibly be traced back to the origin of the system: Sankara considered the Sankhyas as his main Brahmanical opponents and would never have compromised with them, though later Vijñānabhikṣu strove to reconcile both systems. The Naiyayikas fought

against the Sankhyas as well as the Mimamsakas. The only recognized affinities, which did not exclude vast differences and discussions, were those which obtained between Mimamsa and Vedānta (Upaśānta is supposed to be the author of commentaries on both darsanas), Nyaya and Vaiśeṣika, Yoga and Sāṃkhya.

In the time of Vacaspati, however things seem to be changing. He is probably the first one to acknowledge the view of a specialization for each system, which makes it only part of a whole and not an independent totality by itself: *atha prameyavyutpadanaya pravrittam castram kasmāt prmanam samanyato visesatasca lakṣyati? ityāta aha—“prameyasiddhih pramanaddhi”* iti. (Tattva Kaumudi, 4 N. ed. 1940 P. 106) This passage as Sarabodhini rightly says, refers to the idea that Sāṃkhya belongs to support.

group of the three systems which have specialized in the study of the prameyas, the objects of valid knowledge, and therefore, need not explain what a pramana is : the study of the pramanas should be found only in Nyaya. So, by commenting upon all darsanas, Vacaspati probably felt that he was giving a full picture of the Brahmanical system of thought. As a matter of fact, if we examine his commentaries we find that on many topics, he brought about more or less important developments which were actually ideas imported from one darsana into another. He did it quite openly sometimes quoting his commentary on one system when commenting upon another (e.g. Tattva Kaumudi pp. 142, 230, etc...), so that we are forced to understand that, by his time, such a syncretism had become a matter of course. We can illustrate his method by some examples chosen among many others.

In Sankhyakarika 5, inference is said to be of three kinds, which reminds us of Nyayasutra and Bhasya 1-1-5. Gaudapada however explains the three kinds of anumana in a way which differentiates the inference of Sankhya from that of Nyaya : the *purvavadanumana* corresponds to the first

definition given in Nyayabhasya and is illustrated by the same example : from the perception of big clouds, I can anticipate a rainfall. The *sesavadanumana* on the contrary has no equivalent in Nyayabhasya : it is simply the inference which concludes from the property of the part to that of the whole, and it is illustrated by the salty taste of the sea which we infer to be the same everywhere after testing only a small part of it. This type of inference does not seem to have any special importance for Gaudapada. As to the *samanyatodrstanumana*, the example given in both texts is that of the movement of the sun inferred from its being seen in different places at different times, on the analogy of a person who reaches different places by going from one place to another. the Sankhya text does not mention the second definition given in Nyayabhasya. But, curiously enough, when Gaudapada comments upon Ka. 6 which brings in *samanvatodrstanumana* as the means to prove the existence of *pradhan* and *purusa*, his statement cannot be understood unless we refer it to the second definition of that type of anumana given in Nyayabhasya, as well as to the first definition of *sesavadanumana* given by Vatsyayana : *pradhanapurusatind-*

*riyau samanyatodrstanumanenasadh-
yele yasmanmahadadi lingam trigu-
nam/yasyedam trigunam karyam tat
pradhanamili* Actually Gaudapada himself, like the author of the Karikas, will explain this later (ka. 8) as an inference of the cause from its effect, which is none other than *sesavadanumana* of the first type given in Nyayabhasya.

The second definition of *samanyatodrstanumana* given in Nyayabhasya is illustrated by the inference of atman as the support of desire, etc: desire is a quality and needs a substance as its abode, this abode is atman : *icchadayogunah, gunasca dravyasamsthanah, tad yadesam sthanam sa atmeti*. Even this example is difficult to understand as it is : desire may be a quality and as such require a substantial support, but how are we to know that the support is atman rather than any other substance ? Still, atman is a well known substance for Nyaya, and what this anumana wants to prove is not the existence of atman but the supersensual relation between atman and desire as that between an abode and its quality. That is why Gaudapada strengthens his argument under ka. 7 and 9 particularly, showing that supersensual things may exist even

if they are never perceived, and that an effect is of the same nature as its cause (so that we can know the nature of the cause from that of the effect).

Vacaspati is well aware of the difficulties involved in the basic assumptions of the Sankhya system, and he tries to improve them by a clearer definition of the *pramanas* which will prove them. It seems that up to him the Sankhya authors had not taken much trouble to found their statements on sound logical proofs. But the reason for that may be that there was really no known *pramana*—apart from *sruti*—which could give the knowledge of an entity beyond perception. Vacaspati on the contrary has written first his commentary on the Nyayadarsana, where he further develops the criticism brought by Udyotakara against the Bhasya definitions of the *samanyatodrstanumana* : the first type—for which the example given is that of the movement of the sun—can be brought under the *sesavadanumana*, where the cause is inferred from its effect. There remains the second type which is also improved by Vacaspati : from the general properties of all qualities we infer that a desire must have a substantial support.

That much is called *samanyatodrstanumanā*. But when we want to determine the specific cause of desire, we have to resort to *sesavadanumanā* of the second type given in Nyayabhasya: by successive elimination we come to know that desire must have for its cause atman which is the ninth substance accepted by Nyaya (cf. Tatparyatika 1-5, Chowkhamba ed. p. 183-4). If now we turn to Tattvakaumudi, we find Vacaspati quoting himself several times by referring to the Tatparyatika. He consciously introduces his statements as a Naiyayika into his Sankhya commentary, and at the same time adopts them carefully to his new purpose.

Gaudapada under *sesavadanumanā* has mentioned a type of inference which did not occur in Nyaya. Vacaspati does not even discuss it and brings instead the second type of *sesavad* mentioned in Nyayabhasya which he will require later: he does not give any example for it under ka. 5 but says he will give it afterwards, which he does under ka. 9 in his attempt to prove the satkaryavada. When he comes to *samanyatodrstanumanā*, he simply refers the reader to his Tatparyatika, and under ka. 6 he explicitly says that by *samanyatodrstanumanā*, we should

understand both *samanyatodrsta* and *sesavadanumanā*; he wants us to read both in ka. 6 *samanyatodrstad atindriyanam prasiddhir anumanat tasmadapi casiddham paroksam aptagamat siddham*. Isvarakrsna seems to say that supersensual things which cannot be ascertained by *samanyatodrstanumanā* are to be known by *aptavacana*, but Vacaspati asks us to understand *ca* in *tasmadapi casiddham* as referring to *sesavadanumanā*. Under ka. 8 where it is said *karyatas tadupalabdheh*, his commentary is very brief, because for him the real demonstration may come only after the satkaryavada has been proved (ka. 9); he gives it under ka. 15-6 *mahat* and the other *tattvas* are necessarily effects and must have a cause, this cause being unmanifested. These effects are made of the three *gunas*, from which we infer that the cause must have the three *gunas* as its constituents. The demonstration of *purusa* is founded on the same principle, combining *samanyatodrsta* and *sesavadanumanā*. Noticeable also is the fact that Vacaspati, under *samanyatodrstanumanā*, gives an example which is not found in his Nyaya commentary: instead of the inference of atman as the substantial

support of desire, he brings the inference of *indriya*, whereas atman is perceived by internal perception; thus the inference of *pradhana* will be exactly on a par with that of the sense organs.

In this connection, Vacaspati borrows still one more argument from his Tatparyatika which could be deemed the most surprising of all: when trying to prove the pre-existence of the effect in its cause—a theory clearly opposed to the *asatkaryavada* of the Nyaya as he himself says—he refers to Tatparyatika 4-1-18 where he has proved that something cannot be produced out of mere non-existence. The purpose of his statement in his Nyaya work is obviously different from that of Tattvakaumudi, but he does not hesitate to bring it in as one more common point between Sankhya and Nyaya.

If we were to analyse some more examples in detail we should have to exceed the limits of an article, but we would like to mention only two more cases where Vacaspati has clearly identified ideas of different systems which were at first altogether different. In Yogabhasya 4-3, it is said that *dharma* and *adharma* are not the efficient causes of what

happens in the world. Their function is only to set up or remove obstacles and things happen by themselves, the reason given for this being that *dharma* is a result of the actions done in this world and cannot be at the same time their cause. Isvara has no place whatsoever in this picture: the world is going on by itself, *dharma* and *adharma* are part of its working. But the example given to illustrate that idea incidentally brings in an agent: a peasant who wants to flood one field which is on the same level or lower than an already flooded field will not carry the water from one field to the other, but will simply remove the separation between both fields. That is enough for Vacaspati to take the hint and bring Isvara as the ruler who directs the *dharma* according to the wishes of men. Isvara is thus made an efficient cause of the world just as he is in Nyaya, but that is an altogether new idea in Yoga: in Yogabhasya 1-25 it is only said that Isvara's omniscience helps the other beings to get all the knowledge they need after each *pralaya*. Vacaspati has obviously identified the Isvara of the Yoga with that of the Nyaya.

He must also be held responsible for the introduction of the sphota theory in Yoga: it is quite clear that

the idea of sphota is absent from Yogabhasya 3-17, that there is no other word material than letters themselves, and that all the efforts of the author are intended to show how the successive letters cooperate to give the knowledge of a word sense. There is not the slightest hint at the sphota theory, but the letters are supposed to form words thanks to their conventional meaning. However it is said that, when a word has been delimited by its meaning it appears as unit by itself for the mind which grasps the meaning. This is enough for Vacaspati to comment upon that passage as if *pada* meant *padasphota* and

vakya, *vakyasphota*. This sounds strange to us since everywhere else, as a Vedantin or a Mimamsaka or as well as a Naiyayika, he refuted the sphota theory. This might mean that the changes Vacaspati introduces in his various commentaries are not guided by his personal bias, but rather by what must have appeared to him as an obvious identity between different ideas. The confusion was probably never sought for but arose in course of time from more verbal similarities. It would be interesting to know how this has been compatible with the unbroken tradition boasted by all the darsanas.



Vacaspati's Critique of the Bhedabheda Doctrine of Bhaskara

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इस लेख में विद्वान् लेखक ने यह दिखाया है कि वाचस्पति मिश्र ने भामती में जो भेदाभेद सिद्धान्त का वर्णन किया है, उसमें प्रथिकांश भास्कर के मत को ही पूर्व पक्ष में लिया है, क्योंकि भास्कर की वक्तव्यों से बहुत स्थानों के पूर्व पक्ष में समानता स्पष्ट है तथा भास्कर के ग्रन्थ का लेखक जो प्रालोचनात्मक संस्करण प्रस्तुत करना चाहते हैं उसका भी कुछ दिग्दर्शन कराया है।

One of the first, if not actually the first, testimonies to the existence of the Sarirakamimamsabhasya of Bhaskara is, apparently, given by Vacaspatimisra in his Bhamati. When commenting on Sankara's bhasya and Brahmasutra 1. 1. 4, *lat tu samanvayat* Vacaspati enters into a discussion of the doctrine of *bhedabheda* in the precise terms in which it is expounded by Bhaskara in his commentary on the same sutra.

The manner in which Bhaskara introduces the topic of the coexistence of difference and non-difference is curious. It is not, as one would expect, in reply to a fundamental logical position that the two are

mutually exclusive. No, it is a reaction to a statement made very much in passing (it seems) by a mimamsaka whom he introduces as a *purvapaksin*. This mimamsaka remarks : *bhedabheda visayayoh karmajnanakandayoh' parasparavirodhad anyalaranugunyenanyalarad vyakheyeyam* : "inasmuch as the karmakanda and the jnanakanda are mutually exclusive, the one dealing with plurality, the other with non-difference, the one must be so interpreted as to be in agreement with the other ;" whereupon he proposes a particular kind of subordination of the karmakanda to the jnanakanda.

It is clear that Bhaskara has introduced this point in order to enable

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himself to deal with this fundamental topic at an early point in his commentary. And he starts his exposition in reply to the mimamsaka's remark, but very soon includes the advaitin's views in his refutation. *Yad apy uktam*, he says, *bhedabhedavirodha iti tad abhidhiyate—anirupita pramana prameyatattvasyedam codyam*. Thereupon he enters into the discussion which is fundamental to his philosophical position and is attacked by Vacaspatimisra.

His refutation touches upon the following points. In the first place, he argues, the simultaneous existence of difference and non-difference is proved by pramana. Counterarguments based the two types of mutual exclusion do not apply when we have to do with a cause and its product. When there is a cause-product relationship, as between Brahman and the phenomenal world, there is non-difference (for a product does not exclude its cause and is non-different from it) as well as difference.

Let us take up these points. It cannot be demonstrated, according to Bhaskara, that one entity is either wholly different from another or wholly non-different. Entities which differ from one another in certain

particular properties do not differ in certain general properties, as, for example being, knowability, substantiality: every substance possesses these properties. Therefore while a certain substance may be looked upon as different from the point of view of its particularity, it may simultaneously looked upon as non-different from the point of view of its universality: *sattajneyatvadravyatva-disamanyatmana sarvam abhinna-vyaktyatmana ca parasparavailaks-anyad bhinnam*.

Further, there are two types of mutual exclusion (*virodha*), that illustrated by light and shade, non-coexistence (*sahanavasthana*), and that illustrated by heat and cold, occurrence in different loci (*bhinnade-savartitvam*). Neither of these obtains between a cause and its product, for we find that the product is always sewed up (*sarvadanusyutam*) with its cause. This view he summarizes in the samgrahasloka:

*karyarupena samatvam abhedah karamatmana,
hetumatmana yathabhedah karmadadyatmana bhida.*

"There is difference in so far as an entity is product, non-difference in so far as it is cause, just as a thing is non-different in being gold and

different in being a golden earring etc."

Bhaskara applies here with rigorous consistency the *satkayavada*. It is true that a cause can produce a product and that this product before its factual production preexists as cause, the product shares in the properties of the cause. The golden product is gold. Gold, one may say, has two modes of being, as the unparticularized gold and as the particularized golden earring. Likewise, Brahman has the mode of being the product, the phenomenal world.

Vacaspati expounds this view as follows: "A thing is non-different as cause and different as product... It is not correct to say that since non-difference and difference exclude each other both cannot inhere in one thing. We have the cognition that a certain thing is excluded when it runs counter to pramana; whereas a thing is such a thing as the which it is known by pramana. In the proposition: "This earring is gold," we cognize the coordination of gold and earring, and in this cognition both difference and non-difference appear clearly. When there is a relation of supporter and

thing-supported, or when two things have one locus, there is no coordination: for the jujube tree is not the hole; (that is the hole in which the tree is planted) nor, when Caitra and Maitra are sitting on one seat, is Caitra Maitra. This unsublated, unquestioned, universally accepted coordination is precisely what establishes the difference of cause and product. Thus, since products subsist in their cause and the cause everywhere conforms to the form of the products, the product—world—is nondifferent as sat, and different as that product—cow, pot, etc. As they say," and here Vacaspati quotes directly from Bhaskara his samgrahasloka.

In his refutation, Vacaspati seeks to equate the *bhedha* that can coexist with *abheda*, according to Bhaskara, with *parasparabhava*, reciprocal non-existence, or the non-existence of either entity (cause or product) in the other. Does this *parasparabhava* exist between cause and product, he asks. If it does not, they are the same thing; if it does exist, they are two different things. And, he adds, of existence and non-existence it cannot be maintained that they are mutually exclusive, because both cannot inhere

1. Bhamati ad 1. 1. 4, *Anantakrishna's* edition of the *Brahmasutra sankarabhasya* with Bhamati, Kalpataru and Parimala (Bombay 1938) p. 117 ff.

in the same thing : If they could, a bracelet and a **vardhamana** plant would, in consequence, be the same thing, since difference and non-difference are not exclusive.

It seems to me that Bhaskara would not have accepted the relevance of this line of argument, since in effect it restates an objection which he had already recognized and rejected. Though made somewhat more complicated by the introduction of the existence and non-existence of reciprocal non-existence as equivalents for **bheda** and **abheda**, it amounts to saying that **bheda** and **abheda** can never coexist ; which Bhaskara had specifically denied for cause and product, just because the difference between cause and product cannot be stated so absolutely as **paraspara-bhava**, Bhaskara would have taken exception to Vacaspati's assumption.

The advaitin drops this line and takes up another. If a bracelet is not different from gold, golden things like bracelets, diadems, ear-rings etc. are non-different in that they are gold : and accordingly they are also non-different in that they are all bracelet, since the bracelet is gold. This shows that only gold is a really existing thing, (*vastusan*) for in gold no difference are manifest. Of course,

Bhaskara would rejoin, these things are non-different only in that they are gold, not in that they are bracelet and by that token an ear-ring is a thing very different from a bracelet. But, asks Vacaspati, if a bracelet is not different from gold, does it persist in the earring, as the gold persists ? If not, how can you say that the bracelet is not different from gold ? Things that separate while another persists are different from that other thing, like flowers which are different from the string on which they are strung. If ear ring etc do not persist in gold products while gold does, they must be different from gold.

If one accepts conformity of products on the strength of the persistence in them of their common cause, we have no way of distinguishing products as to their identity, place, time and mode. Moreover, if one identified something as gold from a distance, there would be no desire to identify that thing as an ear-ring etc., because they would be non-different from gold, and the gold had already been identified while, if they were different from gold, they would not be known even though the gold were known. But is this not an expected objection from a Vedantin ? Is *sruti* in error when it states the **pratijna**

and *drstanta* : "Have you asked for that doctrine according to which all is known when one is known ? Just as all that is made of clay is known when clay is known. "Hence Vacaspati introduces the objection : "But since there is non-difference too, as we said, why wouldn't they be known ?" On the contrary it follows that they are known. It is the general rule that there is no product when there is no cause : that is to say that the cause of knowledge concerning them is their non-difference from gold ; but as there is also difference, there is no cause of knowledge. This absence of produced knowledge is removed only by the **sale existence** (*karana-sattaya*) of the cause. When there is non-difference the cause exists solely, and then alone the ear-ring etc. are in fact known when the cause is known. But then there is no point in wishing to know them or knowing them. Consequently, if something is not known when something else is known, this means that the two are different things. When gold is perceived from a distance, its variations as ear-ring etc. are not perceived ; therefore they are different from gold.

Vacaspati has here moved to another aspect of the question : general characteristics are insufficient to know

a thing that also has particular characteristics. One may identify it generally as gold from a distance, but the fact that you want to go nearer and identify it really means that it is not gold, just as a vague shape in the distance is not just a vague shape but either a donkey or a young elephant (*karabha*), which may also mean camel. But, one may object, in that case, how can there be a syntactical coordination : "This ear-ring is gold ? After all there must be non-difference to make it possible, but not only non-difference, for then it would be tautological. Somewhat cryptically Vacaspati rejoins that it has been stated that there is no coordination when two things are in a relation of supporter to thing supported, or have the same locus. Or, another objection, how can we have a distinction of persistence and separation, and the desire to know ear-ring etc., also when the gold is known ? The reply is that whether the non-difference be absolute or not, both the distinction and the desire to know are not possible. One of the two, either difference or non-difference will have to be dropped ; now difference can be assumed only upon the prior acceptance of non-difference, not the other way. Since difference depends

on things that differ ; since differing things are each one thing, since in oneness difference has no locus and therefore no basis; since the one thing is not dependent on difference ; and since the perception of difference—"not this but this"—depends on the perception of a correlate from which it differs, while the perception of oneness does not, therefore the assumption of undefinable difference presupposes the acceptance of non-difference and thus the sruti : "The clay alone is real."

In the final analysis, therefore, Vacaspati does not accept the *samanadhikaranya* "this ear-ring is gold," or, in more general terms, "the product is the cause", as a meaningful statement, unless one seeks to express in such a statement the complete non-difference of product from cause, and that the product has no existence, really, as a different thing. Bhaskara's fundamental realism would resist this conclusion : for him the product is the cause hemmed in by obtrusive features which themselves are real enough to establish the reality of the product as product. To Bhaskara's

central doctrine of *upadhi*—because of which Ramanuja, for instance describes his philosophy as *aupadhikavada*—Vacaspati does not, however, refer.

There are other incongruities between Bhaskara's views and the statement and refutation of them by Vacaspati. One is the introduction of *adharadheyabhava* in connection with *samanadhikaranya*. In stating the *bhedabhedavadins* position Vacaspati adds *adharadheyabhava* *na samanadhikaranam / na hi bhavati kundam badaram.* / This is put in his adversary's mouth. Again in his refutation he introduces the objection: *katham tarhi hema kundalam iti samanadhikaranam?* To which he replied : *na hy adharadheyabhava . . samanadhikaranam ity uktam.* But, as far as I can see, Bhaskara holds that the relation between cause and product can be seen as an *adharadheyabhava*; and the *purvapaksin's* position that the *samanadhikaranya* of the type *kundalam idam suvarnam* does not apply in an *adharadheyabhava* can not be deduced from Bhaskara's text. When Bhaskara discusses the *virodha* which it

has been objected, exists between *bheda* and *abheda* he points out that there are two types, *sahanavastha bhinnadesavartitvam*. This latter type is not applicable to the relation between cause and product, he argues. He says : *sitosnayo punar bhinnadharavartinor na kadacid utpadyot-hadakalaksanah sambandho nadharadheyalaksana iti yuktas tayoh parasparavirodhah* ; this must mean that in his view the relation between cause and product is in fact *utpadyot-padakalaksana* and *adharadheyalaksana*. Accordingly he would hold that a *samanadhikaranam* like *kundalam idam suvarnam* can be had in a case of *adharadheyabhava*.

I think we must assume that Vacaspati had not only Bhaskara in mind in his refutation, but also other followers in the complete absence of any other text from Bhaskara's school, not even a commentary, we have no way of finding out how the central position had been developed. That hot discussion had been going on is clear from Bhaskara's text itself. Striking is the polemical tone with which Bhaskara speaks to his adversaries : *nanu sitosnayor yatha parasparam virodhas tatha bhedabhedas-*

yoh kim idam ucyate—nasti virodha iti atrocyate—bhavatah prajnaparadho yamana vastuvirodhah Or : *karanena hi mrtsuvarbadina karyam sarvadanusyutam drsyate/tatraksini nimilya parasparasamgatilaksano virodho vaityayad vaktavyo bhavet prathamikasrotriyasrotraprataranrr-tham va*, where his indignation inspires him to an interesting idiom. Again : *atra pragalbhyat kascid aha*. It is obvious not only that Bhaskara knew what arguments could be raised, but also that they were actually being raised. The fact that his defense of *bhedabhedas* immediately becomes an attack on *advaita* (*vedante nipunammanyah kascid aha*) shows clearly that those arguments came from *advaitins*.

Even though Vacaspati apparently also addressed himself to other *bhedabhedavadins*, who, for instance, developed arguments from the fact of *samanadhikaranya* (compare also the importance which Ramanuja gives to syntactical coordination) (*Vedarthasamgraha*, 6-7 ; 26 ; 67-68) and refined its applicability, still in the main Vacaspati bases himself on Bhaskara. The view that *pramana* is our only criterion for *virodha* is found in the *karikas* :

1. usually *Yadavaprakasa* is mentioned, who had his own form of *bhedabhedas*, of. Ramanuja, o. c. ; 58, P. 225 ; no work of his is extant.

1. *anirvacaniyabheda* ; of. Bhamati I. 4. 26 (p. 429) : *na ca mrdah saravadayo bhidyante, na cabhinna, na va bhinnabhinnah, kim tu anirvaciniya eva.*

2. J. A. B. van Buitenen, *Ramanuja's Vedarthasamgraha* ; introduction, critical edition and annotated translation (Poona 1956) . ; 54 ff. (221 ff.)

chasyaikatvam soti pramanam avagamya,
 anantvam tasya tatparyam kasmad bhedo'pi nesyate.
 yat pramanam pericchinna eviroddham hi tat tatka,
 vatsajalam gavaradi bhinnabhinna pratyate.

Compare Vacaspati's lines : virud-
 dham iti nah (sc. the bhedabhedava-
 dins) kva sampratyaayo yat prama-
 naviparyayena vartate / yat tu yatha
 pramanenavagamya tasya tatha-
 bhava eva. And the concluding
 argument of the advitin seems to be
 specifically directed against the first
 karika. Likewise, Vacaspati's dis-
 cussion of the relation between gold
 (heman) and ear-ring (kundala) is
 based on Bhaskara's samgrahasloka,

Vacaspati has contented himself
 with the refutation of bhedabheda he
 gave ad 1. 1., 4. He refers back to it
 without further comment ad 1. 4. 22
 where the view of the old master
 Kasakrtsnt is given, to which Bhaskara
 adheres : na tavat, the advaitin
 remarks, bhedabhedav ekatra bhavi-
 kau bhavitum arhata iti viprapanci-
 tam prathame pade, i e. ad 1. 1. 4.
 But in the sequel of the same com-
 mentary ad 1. 4. 22 he touches briefly
 on another view of Bhaskara.

The bhedabhedavadin there ex-
 pounds his view that the individual
 soul (*liya*) is a particle (*amsa*) of
 the supreme soul, and he gives several

instances of *amsas*. Vacaspati (Bha-
 mati p. 420) addresses himself to
 some of these instances, and so does
 Ramanuja (Vedarthasamgraha, 56-57'.
 Now the intriguing thing is that both
 the advaitin and the visistadvaitin
 specifically attack the view that the
 space contained in the aural cavity,
 in which also resides the auditory
 faculty, would be an *amsa* of *akasa*.
 This view is, at first sight, not found
 in Bhaskara at all ; but on closer
 looks it turns out that the text of
 Bhaskara is corrupt here and that
 the indirect testimony of Vacaspati,
 supported by the testimony of Rama-
 nuja, can help us in restoring Bhas-
 kara's text.

After the first instance of an *amsa*
 (*Tyathagner visphulingah*), Bhaskara
 apparently adduced three more illus-
 trations : 1. space contained in an
 earthen pot etc. is an *amsa* of *akasa* ;
 2. the space, contained in the aural
 cavity, is an *amsa* of *akasa* and has
 the faculty of perceiving sound ;
 3. the fivefold *prana* in every body
 is an *amsa* of wind. Vacaspati discus-
 ses examples 2 and 3 (in this order),
 Ramanuja examples 1 and 2 (in this
 order). Now it is clear that in Bhas-
 kara's text examples 1 and 2 have
 become mixed up, most probably due
 to haplography.

One group of manuscripts¹ reads
 here : *yathakasasya parthivadyadhistha-
 nopadhyavachinnah chidrapradesah
 tadamsasabdagrahanasaktyapeksa*,
 which gives no sense. One manuscript
 which usually provides better read-
 ings, has : *chidrapradesah tadam-
 sas tatsabdagrahanasaktyayetah*.
 Vacaspati's text must somehow be
 inspired by this ; he states the exam-
 ple as follows : *nabhasa iva karnane-
 mimandalavacchinnam nabhsah sab-
 dagrahanayogyam* (Bhamati p 42.).

In the first place we remark that
 the text of Bhaskara shows an *hiatus*.
 This is proved by the element *tad*—in
tadamsas. This *tad* must represent
akasasya, for we have an example
 here of an *amsa* of *akasa* ; now a con-
 struction *yathakasasya ... chidrapra-
 desah tadamsas* is impossible, since
tad can only repeat *akasa* here : just
 as A is an *amsa* of *akasa*, and B is an
amsa of it (*tadamsah*). Since Bhas-
 kara's text has a compound ending
 in *avacchinnah* and Vacaspati's para-
 phrased quotation has likewise, it is
 very likely that the *hiatus* has occu-
 rred through a haplography caused
 by a repeated *avachinnah* ; in philo-
 sophical texts, with their frequent
 repetition of words, haplography is
 my experience, one of the greatest

single factors of *hiatus* and conse-
 quent proliferating corruption. I
 should therefore conjecturally amend
 Bhaskara's text as follows : *yatha
 vakasasya parthivadyadhisthanopadhy-
 avacchinno kaso msah karnavacchinnas
 ca chidrapradesah tadamsah tadamsah
 sabdagrahanasaktyupetah* "just as the
 space delimited by the adjunct of the
 locus of an earthen pot etc. is an
amsa of *akasa*, and the extent of the
 orifice delimited by the ear is an *amsa*
 of it, possessed of the capacity of
 perceiving sound." Haplographically
 the scribe of the manuscript which
 was the original of the manuscripts of
 both groups continued after the first
avachinnah with the words after the
 second *avacchinnah*, and from there
 on the text was incomprehensible. If
 my argument is accepted, we are able
 to restore Bhaskara's corrupted text
 and account for the refutation which
 no less than two eminent Vedantins
 have devoted to a view which was
 ascribed to Bhaskara. It is one of
 the ironies of the textual criticism of
 Bhaskara's much abused Vedanta
 commentary that his adversaries are
 helpful in restoring to us the view
 which they really are intended to
 demolish. Similarly Sankara's *bhasya*,
 constantly attacked by Bhaskara, can
 aid in restoring the latter's text.

1. A palmleaf grantha MS. Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, descri-
 bed in Triennial Catalogue, R 6123.

2. The reading of the Madras manuscript.

3. Madras MS. *saktyapeksa saktyupetah* ?